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Epistemic policy networks in the European Union’s CBRN risk mitigation policy 
Abstract: This paper offers insights into an innovative and currently flagship approach of the 
European Union (EU) to the mitigation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
(CBRN) risks. Building on its long-time experience in the CBRN field, the EU has 
incorporated methods familiar to the students of international security governance: it is 
establishing regional networks of experts and expertise. CBRN Centres of Excellence, as they 
are officially called, aim to contribute to the security and safety culture in different parts of 
Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia and South East Europe, in the broadly-construed 
CBRN area. These regional networks represent a modern form of security cooperation, which 
can be conceptualized as an epistemic policy networks approach. It offers flexibility to the 
participating states, which have different incentives to get involved. At the same, however, 
the paper identifies potential limitations and challenges of epistemic policy networks in this 
form.  
Keywords: security governance; epistemic policy network; European security; CBRN; 
foreign policy 
Introduction 
The European Union (EU), including the Council of Ministers but also the European 
Commission, has a long history of developing preventive policies in the field of chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, materials and know-how. Already at 
the beginning of the 1990s, the European Community initiated technical assistance - known 
as the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) - with the security 
and safety of nuclear installations constituting an important component of this assistance. The 
low profile of the Community’s activities channelled through TACIS allowed the European 
Commission to develop its assistance relatively uncontested, apart from the criticism directed 
at the actual effectiveness of TACIS (Sodupe and Benito, 1998). As the Cold War years were 
becoming increasingly distant, and in the wake of Russia’s new-found assertiveness of 2000s, 
the priorities of the EU have started to shift.  
In parallel to the policies developed in the Council of Ministers, the European Commission 
has decided to shift its CBRN risk reduction policies to other regions – it went global. The 
experience of TACIS remained important as a learning experience. When, in 2009, the 
European Commission first outlined the rationale for CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE), it 
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was building on its experience of managing TACIS: ‘Taking into account the lessons learned 
through the TACIS programme and the first IfS IP [Instrument for Stability, Indicative 
Programme], the IP 2009-2011 intends to move away from an “ad hoc”, centralized approach 
to promoting coherent, integrated regional networks’ (European Commission, 2009, p. 7). 
The CBRN risk mitigation regional networks, in the form of EU CBRN CoE, constitute the 
empirical focus of this paper. CBRN CoE are the networks of experts, facilities and training 
in regions considered by the EU to be vulnerable in terms of criminal acts (proliferation, 
organized crime and terrorism), natural disasters (pandemics) and accidents (industrial 
catastrophes).  
The participation in such networks is voluntary and countries involved are not obligated to do 
anything – they merely request support to develop necessary capacities addressing a specific 
set of CBRN-related risks. The CBRN CoE is an innovative project launched by the EU in 
2009, with the purpose of ‘developing comprehensive tailored training and assistance 
packages’ in the field of CBRN risk mitigation (European Commission, 2009, p. 8). It is 
implemented jointly with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute (UNICRI). These training and assistance packages are directed at the regions 
currently including different parts of Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia and South East 
Europe. The networks are still in the early stage of their development, but permanent 
Regional Secretariats have already been established in Amman, Algiers, Tbilisi, Manila and 
Rabat. The Regional Secretariats act as focal points for coordinating national and regional 
project development and for establishing long-term, transnational networks of CBRN experts. 
The initiative is financed through the EU’s Instrument for Stability. 
The empirical developments in the EU’s international security governance raise the question 
about the best practice in mitigating contemporary security challenges and risks, and how it 
relates to existing scholarship. Admittedly, the scholarship on International Relations has 
been rather slow in moving beyond the inter-state paradigm and accounting for some of the 
recent empirical developments. The concept of security community, while taking into 
consideration ideational factors, offers a rather static and territorially-bound image of security 
cooperation. Consequently, together with the idea of risk community, it is contrasted with a 
more promising concept of security governance. Security governance, while also limited in 
important ways, offers a much more accurate account of the empirical developments such as 
the CBRN CoE project. The paper is structured in a way which demonstrates this point. 
Following the brief discussion of contemporary security and risk environment, the case study 
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of CBRN CoE is introduced and conceptualized as an example of epistemic policy networks. 
Subsequently, the paper revisits the scholarship on contemporary security cooperation in 
order to evaluate in what ways it falls short of accounting for the case study at hand. Security 
governance is most promising in this respect, due to the central role of policy networks 
typically associated with this form of cooperation.   
Security and risk 
Globalization is constantly changing the nature of security threats and risks facing modern 
societies. While more traditional security threats have not disappeared, we are increasingly 
confronted by man-made and natural uncertainties, threatening the lives and well-being of 
vulnerable societies. Karen Lund Petersen (2012) has offered an excellent overview of 
different ways in which the studies of security and risk speak to each other in recent 
scholarship. It is not the intention to repeat her arguments. Instead, it is important to zoom in 
on one element of the security-risk debate, asking how the concept of risk sometimes 
displaces the concept of security, and what implications this process has for policy-making. 
For Beck, the scale of modern-day risks, from environmental disasters to terrorism and 
conflict, reflects the triumph of modernity. The society is increasingly vulnerable to risks not 
in spite of, but as a side effect of modernization. This fact challenges the basic logic of 
Weberian means-end rationality, because ‘all attempts at rational control give rise to new 
“irrational”, incalculable, unpredictable consequences’ (Beck, 2009, p. 18-19). Table 1 
summarizes the key differences between threats, with their inherent logic of means-end 
rational action, and risks, which stem from the very nature of modern rationality. 
Table 1 
The Cold War rivalry is often presented in the literature as an example symbolising the 
distinction between threat and risk. In short, the threat of the Soviet Union was quantifiable, 
present, finite, with recognized intentions and possible to eliminate. In contrast, the risk of the 
CBRN proliferation from the former Soviet Union countries is unquantifiable, transcends 
time and space and is infinite. Moreover, the intentions of potential proliferators are unknown 
and the risk requires on-going risk-mitigation measures. In his welcome speech during the 
Brussels-based conference ‘Towards a Global Network of Crisis Rooms’ in 2013, Graham 
Hutchings from Oxford Analytica clearly articulated the nature of modern risks:   
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Crises and catastrophes do not respect frontiers. They do not respect spatial 
frontiers, temporal frontiers. They are not respecters of culture and context, of 
wealth, status and gender. They are genuinely international. We have got used in 
the last few decades to a global manufacturing industry, a global financial 
industry, global tourism and the like. What I submit we have not yet got used to is 
a global industry or practice of crisis detection, of crisis analysis, crisis 
monitoring and, most importantly, crisis response (Hutchings, 2013). 
Indeed, the methodology for addressing modern risks and transnational security problems 
remains work in progress. For Beck, transnational cooperation is the key. States must admit 
that, as autonomous units, they are powerless vis-à-vis modern risks and that the only 
solution is the pooling of sovereignty (Beck, 2009, p. 41). In this context, the aforementioned 
initiative of the EU, aiming to mitigate CBRN-related risks through the establishment and 
facilitating of policy networks, is innovative. The primary purpose of CBRN Centres of 
Excellence is to (a) move the EU’s CBRN assistance beyond the territories of the former 
Soviet Union; and (b) develope an innovative approach to CBRN risk governance, drawing 
on its experience in the countries of the former Soviet Union, primarily Russia (European 
Commission, 2009, p. 7; Kaunert and Zwolski, 2013). In fact, the officials involved in CBRN 
CoE argue that ‘if successful, it may be the first time that the EU develops a comprehensive 
approach to threat and risk reduction beyond Russia’ (Dupré and Servais, 2012, p. 2). If 
pooling of sovereignty is a necessary condition for preventing and addressing modern risks, 
expertise-centred policy networks appears as a suitable method for facilitating inter- and 
trans-national cooperation.  
The EU and prevention through epistemic policy networks 
For the purpose of the argument, epistemic policy networks are defined as formal, expertise-
centred structures, purposefully-created by international actors, to address a specific set of 
security risks over the short-to-long term, through capacity-building activities. This 
definition may be more restrictive than it is generally the case in the scholarship on policy 
network theory (Enroth, 2011). It only includes policy networks which have been 
intentionally created to serve a particular policy purpose. In other words, policy networks in 
this definition serve as the instruments with a formal mandate and a delineated scope of 
activities. Essentially, however, this definition is similar to the understanding of policy 
networks proposed by Rhodes (1996). The primary difference may stem from the notion of 
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network self-organization in Rhodes’ definition, which means that they are autonomous and 
self-governing. However, while epistemic policy networks, as defined here, are created and 
managed by formal international actors, some degree of autonomy and self-governing is 
inevitable. Further, Rhodes also emphasizes that governance is about managing networks: 
‘As British government creates agencies, bypasses local government, uses special purpose 
bodies to deliver services, and encourages public-private partnerships, so networks become 
increasingly prominent among British governing structures’ (1996: 658). 
Regardless of the definitional nuances, policy networks in general face similar challenges. On 
the side of achieving effectiveness, these challenges include the problem of coordination and 
trust-building. Coordination, as Mark Bevir (2009: 56-57) notes, ‘occurs when two or more 
policy actors pursue a common outcome and work together to produce it’. Minimum 
coordination is the precondition of interdependence, thus the success of networks depends on 
the degree of coordination among the members. This variable, in turn, is heavily influenced 
by trust (Enroth, 2011). Unfortunately, the methodology of building trust is elusive. Rathbun 
(2012) offers a design for understanding the role of trust in international cooperation by 
juxtaposing rationalist, constructivist and social psychological models. In rational 
institutionalism, states naturally distrust each other. In order to facilitate trust, which can be 
called strategic trust, states create institutions. In social constructivism, trust follows shared 
identity and culture. In this model, we have to analyse how intra-regional relations are 
constructed based on the history of amity versus enmity, particularly in the security sphere. In 
social psychological arguments, to trust is a disposition independent of any situational 
circumstances. States that are ‘general trusters’, are more likely to cooperate than states that 
are ‘general non-trusters’, unless they have evidence that they should not trust in a particular 
case. In this model, we should look for indicators of how ‘generally trusting’ particular states 
are, based on domestic politics, including the ideology of the government in power. 
Epistemic policy networks as formal structures created by international (state and non-state) 
actors do not have to be confined to policy areas involving the mitigation of risks or security 
threats. At the same time, however, if global uncertainties and different security threats 
become increasingly diffused and transnational, policy networks involving experts are 
increasingly considered by international actors as appropriate means of addressing problems. 
International organizations, in particular, are keen to adopt this arguably innovative 
methodology. In their approach to modern security governance, international organizations 
intend to adopt long-term outlook, promote transnational networks of experts, emphasize the 
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voluntary character of cooperation and encourage local ownership. In this project-based 
approach, actors in vulnerable regions are invited to jointly apply for required resources 
(expertise, funding), to address a specific set of risks and security threats. As a consequence, 
international organizations hope to transform mistrust into confidence and national focus into 
regional cooperation. 
Can this approach be effective? Epistemic policy networks entail addressing a specific set of 
security risks over (a) short-to-long term; and (b) through capacity-building activities. This 
property of the networks is embedded in the discussion concerning compliance in 
international relations, launched by Chayes and Chayes (1993). In this debate, scholars argue 
over the best strategies (management or enforcement) to make states behave in accordance 
with international norms and rules. Arguably, managerialist strategies are most popular in 
areas where scientific and technical expertise is crucial (von Stein, 2013). In the context of 
the EU, the consensus seems to have emerged that the European Commission employs the 
mixture of both strategies to ensure compliance of its member states with EU rules (Börzel, 
2003; Tallberg, 2002). While such a mixed approach may be suitable in the EU’s internal 
compliance strategies, external security policy through epistemic policy networks is based on 
managerial strategies, involving ‘non-confrontational, forward-looking and facilitative’ 
(Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002, p. 543) approaches. In this context, the EU develops and 
facilitates epistemic policy networks based on the assumption that non-compliance with 
international security norms and rules is often inadvertent and stems from resource 
constraints rather than malicious intentions. In response to these constraints, networks aim to 
assist participating parties with resources relevant to tackle a given set of security risks within 
a short and (mainly) longer term. Having established the working definition of epistemic 
policy networks, the reminder of this paper applies it to the case study of the EU’s CBRN 
CoE.  
Epistemic policy networks as a formal structure 
In the last few years, the CBRN CoE initiative has emerged as the flagship EU approach to 
CBRN risk mitigation, which is the result of two factors. Firstly, the CBRN non-proliferation 
was allocated with the largest proportion of the Instrument for Stability budget under article 
4, defining the EU’s assistance in the stable conditions for co-operation (€266 million for the 
years 2007-13 = 13 per cent of the total budget) (European Commission, 2007). Secondly, in 
the pool available for CBRN non-proliferation, the CBRN CoE initiative is defined as the 
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‘number one’ priority area for the EU (European Commission, 2009; 2012). This is 
unsurprising, considering that the EU has long planned to move its assistance beyond the 
former Soviet Union and the CBRN CoE enabled the EU to go global. Further, in light of the 
criticism directed towards its previous assistance programmes (Sodupe and Benito, 1998), the 
EU planned to change the methodology of its assistance, by decentralising it and focusing on 
‘local ownership’. Moreover, CBRN CoE reflect the priorities of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540, which provides the international context for the EU’s initiative. 
The following section demonstrates how the EU has adopted epistemic policy networks as an 
approach to mitigate CBRN-related risks. The discussion is organized around three attributes 
of epistemic policy networks: their formality, their expertise-centrism, and their capacity-
building activities. 
The CBRN CoE project is developed within the framework of the Instrument for Stability - 
one of the external assistance financial instruments of the EU, intending to bridge the gap 
between security and development aims in EU external policy (Zwolski, 2012a; b). 
Translating the rationality of the Instrument for Stability into the institutional realities of the 
EU, the instrument can be considered the first attempt to ‘define the Grey Zone between the 
Council’s CFSP, ESDP and the Commission’s development policy, a step that might 
complete existing programmes and encourage active conflict prevention’ (Beer, 2006, p. 34). 
The Instrument for Stability is divided into two parts, regulated by articles 3 and 4. The 
article 3 enables the EU to act in situations of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis. Around three 
quarters of the instrument’s budget (total of €2.062 billion for 2007-2013) is allocated for this 
purpose. The CBRN CoE, on the other hand, is an article 4 project. The article 4 regulates the 
assistance that can be deployed in stable conditions for co-operation. The main priority area 
for this component of the Instrument for Stability includes ‘risk mitigation and preparedness 
relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents’ (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2006). Following the Lisbon Treaty reforms, the CBRN CoE are 
coordinated by the European Commission (Joint Research Centre, Development and 
Cooperation-EuropeAid) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), with the 
potentially greater role of the member states (Dupré and Servais, 2012). UNICRI is involved 
in the implementation. 
Epistemic policy networks are expertise-centred 
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Nowhere is the need for expertise as apparent as in the field of CBRN security, involving a 
myriad of technical and political challenges. CBRN CoE, as a form of transnational security 
governance, aims to fill the need for expertise at national and regional levels. Among the key 
objectives of the initiative are (a) to provide CBRN training to participating countries; (b) to 
support participating countries in developing legal, administrative, and technical measures; 
and (c) to provide a coherent package of training and assistance covering CBRN matters such 
as export control, illicit trafficking, crisis response and redirection of scientists (European 
Commission, 2009). In order to accommodate this need for expertise, CBRN CoE are 
implemented through the system of Regional Secretariats, which to date have been 
established in Amman, Algiers, Tbilisi, Manila and Rabat. They operate as regional focal 
points to coordinate the implementation of CBRN-related projects and to bring together 
relevant regional expertise and resources.  
The regional secretariat of the Centre of Excellence established in each region is 
the driving force of the initiative. It coordinates administrative support provided 
by the EU contractor and local personnel, and the expert support from the EU, 
partner countries or international organizations. It also interfaces with the 
authorities of the hosting country, and finally with the EU delegation and EU 
member states embassies in the host country (Bril, 2013: 239). 
At the national level, the CBRN CoE are developed and implemented through the co-
operation of the so-called National Focal Points of the Partner Countries, which are countries 
outside the EU participating in the networks. They develop regional CBRN risk mitigation 
projects through the Regional Secretariats (Mignone, 2013). The National Focal Points of the 
Partner Countries can comprise a variety of actors as diverse as first responders, police, 
customs, CBRN agencies, ministries, academia and intelligence (Winfield, 2011, p. 50). They 
form teams of around 20-30 experts, representing a country at the regional level through co-
operation with Regional Secretariats. Such teams may play important integrative roles, 
because ‘in many cases it is the first time that many of the representatives that cover the 
whole of CBRN in a country have sat down and talked to each other’ (Winfield, 2011, p. 50). 
At the same time, however, the highly specialized expertise required puts a strain on the 
availability of human resources in the EU and in participating countries (Mignone, 2013, p. 
7). Furthermore, with 29 projects implemented by 18 entities in 42 different countries, as was 
the case in mid-2013 (Schmidt, 2013, p. 1), there is a risk that the expertise which is available 
will not be optimally utilized (Mignone, 2013, p. 7). 
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A wide range of expertise required can indeed put a strain on the availability of human 
resources for the optimal implementation of CBRN CoE. The European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre, together with UNICRI, partially provides the necessary expertise, but it is 
also the role of Regional Secretariats to pool regional resources, for example through the 
organization of round table meetings of National Focal Points. In parallel to the CBRN CoE 
initiative, the EU has recently established ‘a nongovernmental non-proliferation network, 
bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centres’ – the EU Non-proliferation 
Consortium (Council, 2008, p. 10). The goals of the network, in addition to stimulating 
dialogue, were specified as follows: (a) to advise Council officials on non-proliferation 
matters; (b) to advance the EU’s role in non-proliferation, notably by advising the 
representative of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; and 
(c) to raise awareness in third countries about the need to work multilaterally and in 
cooperation with the EU on CBRN-related issues. In relation to CBRN CoE, the Consortium 
should be able to assist the EU as well as national teams in the partner countries in 
identifying relevant sources of expertise. 
Epistemic policy networks support capacity-building 
The CBRN CoE embed the managerial approach to security risk governance, which is 
reflected in their exclusive focus on capacity-building activities over the short-to-long term. 
The networks offer carrots without the threat of sticks – an approach which bears inevitable 
limitations. CBRN CoE are intended to offer a novel methodology to compliance through 
capacity building, based on a number of principles, including: (a) networking, partnerships, 
optimising existing capabilities; (b) addressing specific needs through projects; (c) 
strengthening regional safety culture through pooling local resources and expertise. Michael 
Thornton, the project coordinator, confirms that CBRN CoE operate based on managerial 
assumptions, in which non-compliance results from insufficient resources, rather than 
adversity:  
In all the countries that we have been to so far, and we have been to quite a few, 
they have all indicated that they would like to get something out of this, and 
because it is voluntary they can pick and choose. One country could say that they 
have no legislation in terms of biosafety or biosecurity, and can we help them 
with that? Ok, we can help with that. Another one could say that they have a 
significant problem with illicit nuclear trafficking, so therefore they want to 
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strengthen export control and border monitoring. It is individual, there is no one 
size fits all (Winfield, 2011, p. 48). 
In practice, the scope of the projects funded by the EU through the framework of CBRN CoE 
is broad. For example, one of the latest projects approved for implementation concerns 
improving CBRN emergency response in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon through ‘inter-agency, 
locally trusted structure for the coordination, establishment and implementation of CBRN 
incident response throughout the region’ (CBRN CoE Newsletter, 2013: 2). Many projects 
concern the development of best practice in preventing CBRN accidental and human-made 
disasters. One of them is implemented by the German Office of Economics and Export 
Control (BAFA) in 15 countries across 4 regions, including African Atlantic Façade, Central 
Asia, Middle East and North Africa. This project is intended to last 24 months, which is a 
typical length of CBRN CoE projects. Its main objectives are to (a) develop procedures and 
guidelines to deter illegal trans-boundary shipments of CBRN materials; (b) build trust 
among different entities, agencies, public institutions and other stakeholders; (c) develop a 
sustainable knowledge sharing system; and (d) improve regional inter-agency cooperation 
(www.cbrn-coe.eu). The EU, through BAFA, intends to consult partner countries 
individually, but also to organize a system of seminars – one central and subsequently in each 
region.   
There are a number of factors affecting the outcomes of CBRN CoE, however. These include 
the commitment of EU member states; access to relevant expertise; interaction by different 
project teams; the ability to establish geographical and thematic priorities; establishing an 
accurate verification mechanism and communicating the outcomes to a wider audience 
(Dupré and Servais, 2012; Mignone, 2013). Other challenges are associated with the fact that 
the cooperation with partner countries is voluntary, it involves important matters of security 
risks, and the countries are asked to think through the lenses of regional needs, and not 
merely national interests.  
This approach is fundamentally different from the traditional role of international 
organizations facilitating interstate co-operation. It requires national leaders in the Middle 
East, North Africa, South East Europe, South East Asia and African Atlantic Façade to adjust 
their thinking about preventing CBRN risks. Leaders in these regions are implicitly asked by 
the EU and UNICRI to operate under the assumption that their interests in CBRN matters are 
not so different as to prevent them from developing joint security projects. Building local and 
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regional trust is the intended original contribution of the EU’s CBRN CoE to the environment 
where different nuclear research and technical centres already exist. In fact, project 
coordinators argue that in such a sensitive field as CBRN, trust and confidence are pivotal for 
improving security in a long term: ‘We will not make a real difference in threat/risk reduction 
on the mere substance of our projects. Something has to come first: Trust and Confidence 
Building Measures’ [original emphasis] (Dupré and Servais, 2012, p. 2). 
Politics and power relations in epistemic policy networks 
Epistemic policy networks, as a form of transnational security governance, do not eliminate 
politics and power relations. While international organizations may present their project-
based initiatives as voluntary, de-centralized and cooperative, the underlying structures and 
motives require scholarly attention. The EU’s own initiatives aiming to prevent security 
emergencies, such as the CBRN CoE, should not be considered a priori as any different. In 
fact, the coordinators of CBRN CoE envisage one of many potential problems in managing 
CBRN risk mitigation projects:  
Secretariats of the Centres of Excellence will be small structures composed of ten 
people. They will be subject to pressure by national CBRN teams wanting to put 
forward national agendas. Impartiality skills and corruption awareness training 
(financial and technology vigilance) will be offered to progressively uncouple the 
regional team experts from their national origin (Dupré and Servais, 2012, p. 5). 
Other questions concern the actual motivation of national actors in regions as diverging as the 
Middle East, North Africa, South East Europe, South East Asia and African Atlantic Façade 
to participate in the EU’s sponsored initiative and the extent of possible socialization. The EU 
certainly intends for its network-based methodology to transform the behaviour in regions of 
proliferation concern. This objective, project coordinators believe, can only be achieved by 
building ‘trust and confidence measures’ (Dupré and Servais, 2012, p. 2). At different levels, 
however, we can identify potential problems that international organizations may encounter 
when exercising managerial, project-based approach in international security governance; 
some of these challenges were discussed. Most importantly, the EU is challenged by the fact 
that security policy has traditionally been considered as deeply engrained in the competence 
and identity of sovereign states. At the deeper level, we may argue that ‘even the most 
institutionalized bodies of knowledge advanced by international organizations are contested 
and continually criticized’ (Sending and Neumann, 2011, p. 240). This contestation and 
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criticism often stems from the heterogeneous and contradictory character of norms and values 
projected by international organizations (Sending and Neumann, 2011, p. 240). 
Modern forms of security cooperation: (un)fit for purpose? 
Thus far, the paper has discussed the nature of modern security challenges and risks. While it 
seems that there is universal agreement that the pooling of national sovereignty is necessary 
to address security threats and risks, the method of actually achieving this goal remains work 
in progress. In this context, the paper has introduced the case of the EU’s CBRN CoE and 
conceptualized it as epistemic policy networks. Policy networks enable and can help to 
facilitate inter- and trans-national cooperation. The EU seems to have taken this principle into 
account when developing its own methodology, hoping to address risks comprehensively, 
including their legal, regulatory, enforcement and technical aspects. If this method, relying on 
networking, expertise-sharing and capacity-building is an example of good practice, where 
does it leave us vis-à-vis the scholarship on modern forms of security cooperation? Arguably, 
new forms of security cooperation have not replaced the more traditional ones, most notably 
the alliance and concert. Instead, states are often simultaneously members of different types 
of security multilateralism, such as NATO and the EU. At the same time, scholars have been 
pointing to the limitations inherent in the alliances and concerts, most importantly their 
predominant focus on the military aspects of security and the assumption that all states 
remain Westphalian in character (Sperling, 2009: 4). Modern forms of security cooperation 
enable, and even require, a stronger involvement of non-state actors, such as international 
organizations. Further, they are more appreciative of the fact that security threats are more 
diffused and are often more accurately conceptualized as sociological, economic or natural 
risks (Petersen, 2012).  
Risk and security community 
In response to the changing nature of modern risks, a group of scholars have developed the 
idea or risk community. Williams (2008), drawing on the earlier works by Christopher 
Cocker, conceptualizes risk community and argues that because all risk perceptions are 
subjective, successful risk management requires shared norms, values and institutions among 
the members of the community. For Williams, the West represents an example of risk 
community. However, in order to become more effective in mitigating problems such as 
CBRN proliferation, terrorism or disease, the West cannot rely on the established institutional 
structures. Instead, it must address such challenges through coalitions of the willing, such as 
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the one assembled by the United States for the operation in Iraq. One does not need to dig 
deep, however, to identify problems with conceptualising the system of ad hoc international 
military alliances as an example of risk communities suitable to address problems in a 
manner similar to the methodology of CBRN CoE. Two problems arise immediately. First, 
coalitions of the willing are mostly inter-governmental and do not make use of the 
opportunities offered by transnational cooperation. When addressing modern security 
problems and risks, transnational cooperation is the key, as has been aptly discussed earlier in 
the paper. Second, risk communities, as conceptualized by Williams, are deeply unstable, 
largely depending on domestic politics in participating countries. This, again, runs contrary to 
the ideas behind epistemic policy networks, which aim to bring the elements of stability and 
predictability into the unpredictable and unstable world of risk and security threats.  
The limitations of risk communities, as conceptualized by Williams (2008), seem to be absent 
from security communities, as originally developed by Karl Deutsch and associates (1957), 
and more recently thoroughly revised by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998). In their 
original conceptualization, Deutsch et al. (1957) have distinguished between amalgamated 
and pluralistic security communities. The first type, exemplified by the United States, exists 
whenever there is a ‘formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single 
larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation’ (Deutsch et al., 
1957: 6). In contrast, pluralistic security community is characterized by ‘the legal 
independence of separate governments’. This definition of security community serves as a 
point of departure for Adler and Barnett, but they identify two limitations of the original 
conceptualization. First, they argue that the concept has been ill-defined and thus is difficult 
to operationalize. Second, it has lacked the social constructivist dimension, pointing to the 
role of norms, values and identity in security community.  
As a result, they define security community as ‘a region of states whose people maintain 
dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 30). Focusing on the 
pluralistic type of security community, they further differentiate between (a) loosely-coupled 
security communities, in which states ‘maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ 
(1998: 30) and (b) tightly-coupled security communities, which additionally involve 
collective aid and a system of rule on the verge of sovereign state and transnational, post-
sovereign system. In their conceptual design, Adler and Barnett (1998) also recognize three 
characteristics of security communities. First, in accordance with the social constructivist 
approach, security communities have shared identities, values and meanings. Second, the 
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relations within a community are many-sided and direct. Third, communities involve 
reciprocity and some degree of altruism. Among the examples of security communities are 
Western Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. The latter, as Adler (1998) argues, has 
been developed in a most significant way by the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), although NATO and the EU have also played important roles.  
To what extent can security community account for the empirical developments involving 
epistemic policy networks? Admittedly, the EU’s CBRN CoE involve a system of rule on the 
border of sovereign statehood and transnational, post-Westphalian system. States remain 
important actors, particularly among the partner countries. At the same time, supranational 
structures, most notably the European Commission and the EEAS, are involved in managing 
the networks. Consequently, we should abandon the quest for clear-cut classifications in this 
case. The EU itself is a hybrid system, thus we should only expect that the policies it 
develops will have state-based, transnational and supranational elements. There is a different 
problem, however, when applying the lens of epistemic community to the case study at hand. 
It concerns the territoriality-bias in the idea of security community – the word ‘community’ 
precludes the existence of insiders and outsiders. Both Western Europe and the Euro-Atlantic 
community are defined geographically, whilst the EU’s initiative is functional – it can be 
(and in fact is) global in nature. It is also limited in scope. The countries involved in CBRN 
CoE do not have to fulfil the security community criteria to work together on CBRN-related 
problems. For example, initially, they don’t need to share identities, values and meanings. 
Instead, it is sufficient if they decide that there may be some value to them in joining the 
network and gradually develop mutual trust. As the networks are organized geographically, 
mutual trust and confidence in CBRN matters can emerge over time, but it is unlikely to 
emerge across all regions involved in the CBRN CoE project and involve all security matters. 
Consequently, security community is ill-equipped to account for the recent emergence of 
epistemic policy networks in the form of CBRN CoE. The paper now turns to security 
governance (Krahmann, 2003a; Webber et al. 2004; Kirchner, 2006; Kirchner and Sperling, 
2007; Schroeder, 2011). 
Security governance 
The relationship between security community and security governance is far from 
straightforward. On the one hand, Sperling (2009) recognizes different types of security 
community as forms of security governance. On the other hand, Krahmann and Kirchner 
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clearly differentiate security governance from security communities. In her conceptualization, 
Krahmann (2003a) acknowledges that security governance shares some qualities with Adler 
and Barnett’s (1998) approach to Deutsche’s security community. At the same time, 
however, she points out that security governance differs from security community because it 
involves a range of formal and informal institutions; it offers a better framework to capture 
the changing coalitions of member states as well as increasing reliance on private actors; and 
it accounts for security arrangements which are more fluid and flexible. Kirchner (2006) 
complements this list with the observation that security communities are more exclusive than 
security governance systems. While the existence of a security community precludes 
outsiders, or ‘the other’, the system of security governance can include varying degrees of 
participation – an issue discussed with reference to CBRN CoE. Furthermore, Kirchner points 
out that there is some tension in how the role of international institutions is perceived in the 
security community scholarship. Security governance, in contrast, is unambiguous in that the 
institutions play a central role in promoting security inside and outside of the security 
governance system.  
There are different conceptualizations of security governance, including various attempts at 
summarising this strand of the scholarship (Bevir and Hall, 2013; Christou et al., 2010: 342-
46; Kirchner and Domínguez, 2011: 5-11; Schroeder, 2011: 30-36; Sperling, 2009: 4-6). The 
most common approach is to adapt the ‘governance turn’ in international relations (Rosenau 
and Czempiel, 1992), European Studies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006) or national 
politics (Rhodes, 1997) to the problem of security cooperation. Some important recent 
contributions in this journal have undertaken an effort to take the ‘security governance’ 
scholarship to the next analytical level. Notably, Sperling and Webber (2014) argue that 
systemic factors have been neglected at the expense of agency in this strand of scholarship. 
Thus, they ask ‘how and why security actors behave in the aggregate and whether that 
behavior reflects wider systemic properties’ (2014: 1). Ehrhart, Hegemann and Kahl (2014), 
in the same issue, aim to deepen the analytical value of ‘security governance’ by 
transforming this concept into critical questions and enhance it as a critical tool. 
Schroeder (2011: 31) neatly encapsulates the key characteristics of ‘governance’ as referring 
to ‘a mode of political decision-making beyond hierarchical government of a traditional 
interventionist state’. This is a very broad definition, but in fact it may even be too restrictive, 
because governance does not have to take place only at the ‘decision-making’ stage. As 
Rosenau (1995) argues, governance may include ‘systems of rule’, which entail ‘control’ and 
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‘steering’. Schroeder further notes that governance ‘provides a framework for understanding 
the fragmentation of authority to new actors and levels, and it enables a comprehensive 
analysis of interactions in a sector characterized more by complex decision-making and 
nested responsibilities for action’ (2011: 31).  
This complex decision-making in the system where authority has become more fragmented 
points to one important attribute of the security governance system – policy networks. Within 
these networks, the position of different kinds of experts has become central, not least due to 
the myth of ‘expert knowledge’, which is highly institutionalized by the established Western 
educational system (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 344). Writing his contribution over 90 years 
ago, Weber (1978, p. 975) has already noted that ‘[t]he more complicated and specialized 
modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting apparatus demands the personally 
detached and strictly objective expert’. Weber was writing about the growing complexity of 
culture long before the digital age revolutionized the sources and nature of security threats 
and risks, introducing new levels of complexity and technological progress (Giddens, 1990; 
Beck, 1999). In consequence, we require experts to address these risks at least as much as 
states needed tanks to conduct warfare in the 20
th
 century. Policy networks involving experts, 
or epistemic policy networks, constitute therefore a crucial element of the contemporary 
system of security governance.  
As a consequence, the idea of security governance appears most appropriate to account for 
the recent empirical developments discussed in this paper. Most importantly, it overcomes 
two shortcomings of security communities. Firstly, it does not have to be limited to a 
particular territory – it can involve functional cooperation on particular security problems, i.e. 
CBRN security governance, counter-terrorism governance, etc. Secondly, it emphasizes the 
role and importance of non-state actors, most notably international institutions. This is 
unsurprising, considering the fact that, in the literature to date, security governance has been 
mostly applied to the EU. In this paper, the focus has not been so much on the EU itself, 
which could be defined as a post-Westphalian security community. Rather, the focus has 
been on what the EU does in international security, which can be accounted for by the 
concept of security governance better than by other concepts. Policy networks have 
traditionally been at the core of the security governance agenda, whether at the level of the 
EU (Krahmann, 2003b) or sub-national politics (Rhodes, 1997). In fact, the two concepts are 
sometimes used interchangeably. This brings us back to Beck’s recommendations for more 
transnational cooperation and the pooling of sovereignty. Is the network-based security 
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governance, as exemplified by the EU’s CBRN CoE, the best method for preventing and 
mitigating contemporary transnational risks?  
While it clearly has the benefit of enabling and supporting transnational cooperation, it is not 
free from limitations. Schroeder (2011), for example, questions the implicit assumption that 
horizontal forms of cooperation have a higher problem-solving capacity than hierarchical 
systems. She also points to the neglect of political power and formal authority in the 
governance-oriented analyses. When we apply these concerns to the case study discussed in 
this paper, and the idea of epistemic policy networks more broadly, three main limitations 
become apparent. Firstly, international entities may see insufficient value in establishing 
knowledge-based networks by considering them as either too costly and/or ineffective. In 
particular, national governments may find it politically too risky to commit resources to 
policies which may not produce noticeable positive outcomes before the next round of 
elections. It does not come as a surprise that ‘many current political practices in established 
democracies are very ill-suited to the task of delivering long term policy goals’ (Stoker, 2012: 
5). Secondly, even when actors recognize the value of expertise in addressing a given security 
challenge, different scenarios are possible which can hamper the emergence of the networks. 
For example, there may be the deficit of sufficient expertise and knowledge about a given 
security problem, such as new types of pandemic disease. More fundamentally, the 
legitimacy of policy networks may be challenged when there are conflicting expert views or 
because experts are selected, rather than elected democratically. Scholars have been pointing 
to these risks by coining terms such as epistocratic dominance and technocracy (Ellul, 1954; 
Eriksen, 2011). Thirdly, epistemic policy networks rely on the voluntary cooperation of all 
actors involved. International entities establishing and facilitating these networks may only 
try to persuade states to become members and to commit extra resources, modify behaviour, 
technical standards, regulations, etc. The outcome of this persuasion does not have to be 
positive, however, particularly in sensitive matters involving security problems.  
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding some of the potential and actual limitations of security governance, there 
currently is no better framework to account for the empirical developments in international 
security cooperation involving policy networks. Prevention is the key in this approach and in 
the case of the EU’s CBRN CoE it involves mainly the transfer of best practice; providing 
training and mentoring; and the development of guidelines and legislation. The future 
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research may include the comparison of the EU’s CBRN CoE and other examples of 
epistemic policy networks, such as the initiatives developed under the auspices of 
(International Nuclear Security Education Network), or coordinated by (International 
Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres), the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA, 2012). Of course, the so-called managerialist approaches to 
international compliance with (security) norms, of which epistemic policy networks are an 
example, are most appropriate in areas where scientific and technological expertise is crucial 
(von Stein, 2013). The identified limitations of the security governance will require further 
scrutiny. Most importantly, we need to keep asking whether horizontal forms of cooperation 
have a higher problem-solving capacity than hierarchical systems, ideally with reference to 
particular case studies. This implicit assumption has populated over two decades of 
governance research. While it is too early to answer this question with regards to the EU’s 
CBRN CoE, project coordinators already signal the limits of the bottom-up approach: 
[P]rocedures are necessary for the accession of new States, to withdraw a 
programme, to establish consortiums including not only Member States but also, 
crucially, international organizations such as the IAEA, NGOs such as the ICRC, 
and universities. Procedures and directives are needed to establish the respective 
roles of the Commission, the EU diplomatic arm (EEAS), delegations, and 
embassies (Dupré, 2012: 1).  
Undoubtedly, the CBRN CoE project offers interesting avenues for further research. Scholars 
interested in the evolution and performance of the EU in international security governance, 
including the prevention of man-made and natural emergencies, are presented with interesting 
new case studies. Theoretical tools and frameworks, such as the ‘international practice’ 
(Adler and Pouliot, 2011) approach, may be helpful in uncovering interesting patterns of the 
EU’s policy internationally. Scholars focusing on the role of governmental and non-
governmental transnational actors, such as epistemic policy networks, may be attracted by the 
scope of the EU’s CBRN CoE initiative and how transnational links are being developed to 
strengthen cooperation. Finally, analysts studying regional/transnational/global security 
governance will find a growing number of international security governance initiatives 
relying, at least partially, on project management. The challenges and opportunities 
associated with capacity building of this type are worth further research.   
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Table 1. The differences between threats and risk. 
Threat Risk 
Can be controlled rationally Rational control leads to new uncertainties 
Quantifiable, capabilities can be counted Unquantifiable 
Occupy the present Transcend time and space 
Intentions are recognized Intentions are unrecognized or don’t exist 
Threats are finite Risks are infinite 
Threats can be eliminated Risk-management never ends 
 
